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EMPLOYEE, VOLUNTEER, OR NEITHER?
PROPOSING A TAX-BASED EXCEPTION TO FLSA
WAGE REQUIREMENTS FOR NONPROFIT INTERNS
AFTER GLATT V. FOX SEARCHLIGHT
Jane Pryjmak*
Abstract: The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) mandates compliance with various
requirements, including minimum wages, for individuals classified as “employees.” But
courts have grappled with the definition of “employee” for decades. They have struggled to
determine whether individuals who are not classified as employees by their employer and are
instead labeled “trainees,” “interns,” “externs,” or otherwise must be paid fair wages under
the FLSA. This question became more pronounced amid the rise of unpaid internships for
students and recent graduates in the post-2008 recession years. In Glatt v. Fox Searchlight,
the Second Circuit became the first federal court of appeals to specifically address the unpaid
intern issue in the context of for-profit employers, holding that interns were employees if the
employer received the “primary benefit” from the relationship. The case did not touch on
unpaid nonprofit internships, which some scholars believe are—and should be—exempt from
employee tests under a broad nonprofit exception. However, recent scholarship exploring the
Second Circuit’s logic in Fox Searchlight indicates that unpaid nonprofit internships may not
be so safe for employers after all, and suggests that these internships should not be exempt
from FLSA requirements for public policy reasons.
This Comment argues that some, but not all, nonprofits deserve differential treatment
with regard to internships given their budgetary constraints and the important role they play
in society. It attempts to balance the policy concerns on both sides of the issue by proposing
three narrow exceptions which track the Internal Revenue Code’s treatment of nonprofit
organizations: one for interns supporting exempt purpose activities; another for interns
working at organizations classified as public charities; and the last for interns at small
nonprofits, as determined by their annual tax filing. This tax-based approach would be easy
for nonprofits to apply and current law supports it. Finally, this Comment calls for legislative
action to amend and clarify the FLSA by adopting one of these three exceptions.

INTRODUCTION
For college-educated young adults in the United States, internships
have become a career rite of passage.1 The merits of a position are

* J.D. Candidate, 2017, LL.M, Taxation Candidate 2018, University of Washington School of
Law. Thanks to Professors Lea B. Vaughn and Shannon Weeks McCormack for their thoughtful
comments, and the Washington Law Review team for their outstanding editorial work.
1. See Percentage of Students with Internship Experience Climbs, NAT’L ASS’N OF COLLS. &
EMP’RS (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.naceweb.org/s10072015/internship-co-op-student-survey.aspx
[https://perma.cc/NW9C-FJWB] (noting that sixty-five percent of those who graduated with a
bachelor’s degree in 2015 participated in an internship and/or co-op).
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obvious: résumé value, networking opportunities, exploration of a
potential future career, and a path to a full-time position.2 Some say
these benefits are compensation enough, particularly given the time and
effort required to train interns for the often-short length of time they
serve an organization.3 In the wake of the 2008 recession, these unpaid
internships became far more common, if not the norm in both for-profit
and nonprofit organizations.4
Eventually, the interns began to fight back.5 The grounds for their
complaints lay in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which
provides (among other things) a national minimum wage for covered
employees.6 But the question remained—were interns “employees”
under the FLSA?
The FLSA’s definition of “employee” is murky at best.7 The
Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD) has put forth
various guidance documents regarding individuals with questionable
employment status, such as trainees, interns, and externs.8 But this
agency guidance has not gone through the notice-and-comment process
and lacks the force of law, so courts will defer to it only to the extent
they find it persuasive.9
Courts have spent decades trying to make sense of the “employee”
question, and their opinions have resulted in little more than continued
confusion across circuit lines.10 In 2015, the Second Circuit heard the
now-quintessential intern case, Glatt v. Fox Searchlight,11 which

2. Heather R. Huhman, Why You Should Get a Summer Internship, U.S. NEWS: CAREERS (Apr.
29, 2011), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/outside-voices-careers/2011/04/29/why-youshould-get-a-summer-internship [https://perma.cc/MZY3-3EUR].
3. See Sanjay Sanghoee, Should All Interns Get Paid?, FORTUNE (Apr. 17, 2014),
http://fortune.com/2014/04/17/should-all-interns-get-paid/ [https://perma.cc/YE9K-GTVA].
4. ROSS PERLIN, INTERN NATION: HOW TO EARN NOTHING AND LEARN LITTLE IN THE BRAVE
NEW ECONOMY xvii (2012).
5. Maya Pope-Chappell, We Talked to the Black Swan Intern Who Sued Fox. He’s Not Giving
Up., LINKEDIN: PULSE (July 10, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/former-unpaid-intern-whosued-fox-searchlight-speaks-pope-chappell [https://perma.cc/Y4WH-K8SV].
6. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).
7. See id. § 203(e)(1); discussion infra section I.A.
8. E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., Fact Sheet #71: Internship Programs Under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (Apr. 2010), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.htm
[https://perma.cc/42JA-S2B3] [hereinafter Fact Sheet #71]; 6 WAGES & HOURS MANUAL 91:156
(2016) [hereinafter W&H MANUAL].
9. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001).
10. See infra Part II.
11. 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2016).
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involved unpaid interns on the set of a big-budget, award-winning film.12
In Fox Searchlight, the court outlined a new test for delineating interns
from employees, at least in the narrow context of for-profit
organizations.13 While companies are abuzz with the crisis of losing their
unpaid interns, the case has resulted in nonprofits asking the same
question: Do we have to pay interns now, too?14
There is a persistent belief, propagated by the Department of Labor
(DOL), that nonprofits are exempt from the strictures of the FLSA with
regard to unpaid internships.15 This idea is supported by the policy
argument that nonprofits, particularly charitable ones, deserve such an
exception given their altruistic purposes and the important role they play
in society.16 But this exception rests on unsteady legal ground,
particularly in the wake of Fox Searchlight.17 Recent scholarship
suggests that the Fox Searchlight decision is the “beginning of the end”
for unpaid nonprofit internships.18 This Comment will argue that the
above conclusion is premature, given the confusion created by the circuit
split.19
Up to this point, scholarship surrounding nonprofit internships and the
FLSA has focused only on blanket nonprofit exceptions and tests
applicable to all nonprofits.20 This Comment will use statutory text,
legislative history, Supreme Court precedent, and policy considerations
12. Id. at 532–33 (describing plaintiffs Eric Glatt, Alexander Footman, and Eden Antalik).
13. Id. at 536. However, as will be explored in Part II, this test is not actually new at all. See Solis
v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011); McLaughlin v. Ensley,
877 F.2d 1207, 1209 (4th Cir. 1989).
14. See Andrew J. Rotherham, The High Cost of Unpaid Internships, U.S. NEWS: OPINION (Apr.
4,
2016),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/knowledge-bank/articles/2016-04-04/education-orexploitation -should-all-internships-be-paid [https://perma.cc/DVA2-C8RB].
15. See Susan Harthill, Shining the Spotlight on Unpaid Law-Student Workers, 38 VT. L. REV.
555, 600–01 (2014); Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8; Blair Hickman & Christie Thompson, When Is It
OK to Not Pay an Intern?, PROPUBLICA (June 14, 2013), https://www.propublica.org/article/wheninterns-should-be-paid-explained [https://perma.cc/3ZZX-EU7K].
16. See infra section III.B.2.
17. See infra section III.C.1.
18. See generally Thomas Johnson, Note, The Fox Searchlight Signal: Why Fox Searchlight
Marks the Beginning of the End for Preferential Treatment of Unpaid Internships at Nonprofits, 102
VA. L. REV. 1127 (2016).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See Harthill, supra note 15; Johnson, supra note 18; Maurice S. Pianko, Dealing with the
Problem of Unpaid Interns and Nonprofit/Profit-Neutral Newsmagazines: A Legal Argument that
Balances the Rights of America’s Hardworking Interns with the Needs of America’s Hardworking
News Gatherers, 41 RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 36–37 (2014); Anthony J. Tucci, Worthy Exemption?
Examining How the DOL Should Apply the FLSA to Unpaid Interns at Nonprofits and Public
Agencies, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1363, 1384 (2012).
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to show that a blanket exception is a misguided approach.21 As a novel
alternative, it will propose three new, narrow nonprofit exceptions based
in the Internal Revenue Code—the law governing the very existence of
nonprofits—and advocate for Congress to adopt one of them.22
Part I will explore the background of the FLSA and its requirements,
what the text of the statute and limited Supreme Court precedent
contribute to the interpretation of the “employee” definition, and the
guidance the WHD has offered on the topic. Part II will survey the tests
circuit courts have developed to classify interns and similar workers as
employees or non-employees. Part III will apply these tests to nonprofit
interns and examine the arguments for broadly exempting nonprofits
from FLSA requirements. Finally, Part IV will advocate for a narrow
exception derived from tax law.
I.

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT REQUIREMENTS FOR
MINIMUM WAGE

The FLSA was first proposed to Congress in 1932, amid the
employment crisis of the Great Depression.23 After years of conflict
between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Congress, the bill finally
became law in 1938.24 By the time of its passage, political wrangling had
narrowed the legislation to the point that it only applied to one-fifth of
the U.S. working population,25 yet it introduced major standards that
American workers would enjoy in the decades to come: the prohibition
on child labor, a minimum wage, and overtime payment for non-exempt
employees working more than forty hours in a week.26 While many
perceive that its purpose was to eliminate harsh conditions for workers,
it also targeted unemployment. Said one proponent of the law:
“[U]nnecessarily long hours which wear out part of the working
population . . . keep the rest from having work to do.”27 This job-creating

21. See infra section IV.A.
22. See infra section IV.C.
23. Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum
Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/flsa1938.htm
[https://perma.cc/62TP-745K].
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. At the time, however, the standard workweek was forty-four hours. Id.
27. 81 CONG. REC. 1480 (1937) (statement of Sen. Minton).
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sentiment has undergirded discussions of the FLSA’s scope ever since,
including its application to internships.28
The past eighty years have seen many changes and amendments to the
FLSA: added provisions for overtime pay,29 the prohibition of various
forms of discrimination,30 protection for migrant workers,31 and others.
However, the law is still limited in one major aspect: It covers only
individuals classified as “employees.”32
Yet the term “employee,” as defined under the FLSA, is broad and
ambiguous.33 Both the Supreme Court34 and the DOL35 have taken steps
to clarify when individuals who are not treated as traditional employees
by their employers are “employees” for the purposes of the FLSA.
A.

The FLSA’s Definition of “Employee” Is Ambiguous

The relevant portion of the FLSA states the requirements for
minimum wage:
Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages at
the [rate of] . . . $7.25 an hour . . . .36

28. See, e.g., Katherine S. Newman, The Great Recession and the Pressure on Workplace Rights,
88 CHI.-KENT L. REV 529, 531 (2013) (“We have seen growth in reliance on contingent/temporary
workers and unpaid interns, which typically provide few job protections and no benefits to such
employees, as well as negatively impact the wages and bargaining power of the core labor force and
overall job creation.”).
29. Wage and Hour Division History, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/whd/
about/history/whdhist.htm [https://perma.cc/B6HW-6LCX].
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., Fact Sheet #14: Coverage Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) (July 2009), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs14.htm
[https://perma.cc/A4ZD-E4R5]. Employees may fall under the auspices of the FLSA as either part
of an enterprise or as an individual, but due to the broad scope of individual coverage, nearly all
employees are covered individually regardless of the size or business of their employer. See Fair
Labor Standards of Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2012). This Comment will primarily concern
itself with nonprofit interns as covered individuals.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1).
34. See Portland Terminal v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947); Tony & Susan Alamo
Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985); discussion infra section II.B.
35. See Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8 and discussion infra section II.C.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). The section provides three different rates with staggered starts beginning
in 2007; the current rate is $7.25. Id.
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In the definitions section of the statute, “employee” is defined as “any
individual employed by an employer.”37 The FLSA lists several
exceptions to this broad definition, including family members engaged
in agriculture and volunteers.38 However, the volunteer exception is very
narrow; it only expressly extends to individuals who volunteer for (1) a
public agency, or (2) private nonprofit food banks “solely for
humanitarian purposes.”39
The text’s definition of “employ” is the broadest of all: “to suffer or
permit to work.”40 Understandably, the limits of this five-word phrase
have required substantial judicial interpretation and incited a great deal
of scholarly debate.
B.

The United States Supreme Court Narrowed the Definition of
“Employee” in Portland Terminal and Alamo Foundation

Despite the numerous lower court cases on the “employee” definition,
the Supreme Court has only heard a handful of cases on the issue, and
only two of them are relevant here.41 Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.42
addressed the question of when a trainee is an employee in the for-profit
context, while Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of
Labor43 considered whether participants in a nonprofit rehabilitation
program are employees.44 Together, the two opinions primarily focused
on three factors: (1) whether the organization and individual had agreed
to some form of compensation;45 (2) which party received the

37. Id. § 203(e)(1).
38. Id. § 203(e)(2)–(5).
39. Id. § 203(e)(4)–(5).
40. Id. § 203(g).
41. Other cases which are beyond the scope of this Comment include Christopher v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012) (holding that pharmaceutical sales reps fell under the “outside
salesmen” exemption and were not employees); Holly Farms Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 517 U.S. 392
(1996) (holding that live-haul livestock workers were employees and not exempt as agricultural
workers); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947) (evaluating the independent
contractor-or-employee question); United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 (1945) (holding
that “[t]he time or mode of compensation, in other words, does not control the determination of
whether one is an employee within the meaning of the Act”); and Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co., 315 U.S. 386 (1942) (holding that redcaps at railroad stations were employees).
42. 330 U.S. 148 (1947). The Court also heard and decided Walling v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry.,
a case with essentially the same facts, on the same day by applying the Portland Terminal holding.
330 U.S. 158 (1947).
43. 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
44. Id. at 291–92.
45.Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 300–02; Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 151–53.
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“immediate advantage” from the individual’s work;46 and (3) whether
the activities the individual’s work supported were of a commercial or
charitable nature.47 Despite the age of these decisions,48 both opinions
offer key guidance to determining whether interns are employees under
the FLSA.
1.

Portland Terminal Looks for Agreement to Compensation and
“Immediate Advantage” in the Context of Railroad Trainees

Portland Terminal, a case originally brought in the Federal District
Court of Maine at the end of World War II,49 involved railroad brakemen
who received a training course prior to entering full-time work in the
field.50 This preliminary training lasted roughly a week and included
observations of brakemen in their regular activities, followed by
completion of “actual work under close scrutiny.”51 The railroad did not
guarantee full-time positions to brakemen who completed the training
course; however, brakemen had to complete the course to be considered
for full-time positions.52 The Court noted that the trainees’ work did not
displace that of full-time employees or “expedite the company[’s]
business”; rather, it had quite the opposite effect.53
The Court began its analysis by further noting that the FLSA
contained a provision for flexible wages for trainees and apprentices but
concluded that “the section carries no implication that all instructors
must either get a permit or pay minimum wages to all learners; the
section only relates to learners who are in ‘employment,’” and turned to
the definition of “employ” found in section 3(g).54 The Court determined
that Congress intended that definition to be broad enough “to insure that
every person whose employment contemplated compensation should not
be compelled to sell his services for less than the prescribed minimum
wage,” but not so broad as to include “all persons . . . who, without any
express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their own
46. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 153.
47. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 295–99.
48. Alamo Foundation was decided in 1985. Id. at 290. Portland Terminal was decided in 1947.
Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 148.
49. Portland Terminal v. Portland Terminal Co., 61 F. Supp. 345 (D. Me. 1945).
50. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 148.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 150.
53. Id. (noting that trainees’ work “may, and sometimes does, actually impede and retard”
company business).
54. Id. at 152.
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advantage on the premises of another.”55 The Court took particular issue
with the fact that the brakemen trainees could have received the same
training in a vocational school “wholly disassociated” from the railroad,
in which case no one could have reasonably argued that they were
railroad employees.56 It also highlighted that the railroad received no
“immediate advantage” from the trainees and therefore held they were
not employees.57
2.

Alamo Foundation Considers Agreement to Compensation and the
Nature of Work Activities in the Context of Rehabilitation Program
Participants

Nearly forty years after Portland Terminal, the Court revisited the
“employee” definition in Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v.
Secretary of Labor.58 The defendant was a private religious foundation
which, among other activities, rehabilitated “drug addicts, derelicts,
[and] criminals.”59 The Foundation did not receive support from the
public and instead funded itself by operating several business ventures
including a motel, hog farms, and retail stores.60 Individuals involved in
the rehabilitation program, known as “associates,” provided the majority
of staffing for these businesses.61 The associates received benefits
including housing, food, and clothing, but were not paid wages.62
The Court evaluated three questions in its review of the case: first,
whether a nonprofit such as the foundation could be considered an
“enterprise” under the FLSA; second, if the associates were employees
and therefore entitled to minimum wage; and third, if application of the
FLSA to the Foundation would infringe on the organization’s religious
freedom under the First Amendment.63 Only the first two issues are
relevant to this Comment.
In determining whether or not the associates were employees of the
Foundation, the Court referenced its holding in Portland Terminal.64

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 152–53.
Id. at 153.
471 U.S. 290 (1985).
Id. at 292.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 291–92.
Id. at 300.
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Like the railroad trainees, the Foundation associates had no expectation
of compensation.65 But unlike the trainees, associates worked for the
Foundation for months, not days, and received in-kind benefits as part of
their arrangement.66 These benefits, the Court held, created an “implied”
compensation agreement and were “wages in another form.”67 The true
test of employment hinged on the “economic reality” of the situation,
and an implied agreement indicated an employer-employee relationship
as much as an express one would.68
The “enterprise” question derives from the fact that the FLSA may
cover employees in one of two ways: as individuals or as part of an
enterprise.69 Whereas individual coverage applies to any individual who
is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,
enterprise coverage requires that the employer business have gross
annual sales of more than $500,000 in addition to this commercial
engagement.70
Here, the Court noted that the statute contained no express exception
for commercial activities conducted by nonprofit or religious
organizations, and that it had been “consistently construed . . . ‘liberally
to apply to the furthest reaches consistent with congressional
direction.’”71 It also gave deference to the Labor Department’s
regulations, which state that “where [religious] organizations engage in
ordinary commercial activities, . . . the business activities will be treated
under the Act the same as when they are performed by the ordinary
business enterprise.”72 In addition, the Court referenced the legislative
history of the Act, which indicated an intent to exclude non-commercial
activities of nonprofits, but not to create a blanket exemption for
nonprofits.73 The Court concluded that “the Foundation’s businesses
serve the general public in competition with ordinary commercial
enterprises,” and were therefore enterprises under the FLSA.74 It noted,
however, that FLSA coverage of these activities would not “lead to
65. Id. at 301.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Fair Labor Standards of Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2012).
70. Id.
71. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 296 (quoting Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assocs., 358 U.S.
207, 211 (1959)).
72. 29 C.F.R § 779.214 (2012).
73. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 297–98. For further discussion, see infra section IV.A.
74. Id. at 299.
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coverage of volunteers who drive the elderly to church, serve church
suppers, or help remodel a church home for the needy”; it reached only
the “ordinary commercial activities” of such organizations, and the
Court’s interpretation would not threaten “ordinary volunteerism.”75
C.

The WHD Develops a Six-Part Test

In the wake of the Portland Terminal decision, the WHD outlined a
six-part test for determining whether trainees were employees for the
purposes of the FLSA.76 As internships became a widely accepted part
of education and career development, the WHD revisited the test and
developed Fact Sheet #71, which applies the same six factors to unpaid
internships.77 The test is substantively the same, save for slightly
different language that reflects the new terminology.78 The test draws
upon factors provided in Portland Terminal and consists of the
following criteria:
(1) The internship, even though it includes actual operation of
the facilities of the employer, is similar to training which
would be given in an educational environment;
(2) The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern;
(3) The intern does not displace regular employees, but works
under close supervision of existing staff;
(4) The employer that provides the training derives no
immediate advantage from the activities of the intern; and
on occasion its operations may actually be impeded;
(5) The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the
conclusion of the internship; and
(6) The employer and the intern understand that the intern is not
entitled to wages for the time spent in the internship.79
The Fact Sheet makes clear that the WHD expects employers to meet
all of the factors to avoid having their interns classified as employees.80
It also specifies that the test is only applicable to for-profit internships,81
but contains one footnote referencing non-profits:
75. Id. at 302–03.
76. W&H MANUAL, supra note 8.
77. Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8.
78. Exchanged terminology includes “intern” instead of “trainee,” “educational environment”
instead of “vocational school,” etc. See W&H MANUAL, supra note 8.
79. Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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The FLSA makes a special exception under certain
circumstances for individuals who volunteer to perform services
for a state or local government agency and for individuals who
volunteer for humanitarian purposes for private non-profit food
banks. WHD also recognizes an exception for individuals who
volunteer their time, freely and without anticipation of
compensation for religious, charitable, civic, or humanitarian
purposes to non-profit organizations. Unpaid internships in the
public sector and for non-profit charitable organizations, where
the intern volunteers without expectation of compensation, are
generally permissible. WHD is reviewing the need for additional
guidance on internships in the public and non-profit sectors.82
While this guidance is clear on its face, it is unfortunately only that—
guidance. As the agency tasked with implementing the FLSA, the DOL
is afforded some deference when it interprets that statute.83 The amount
of deference the interpretation receives depends on how the agency takes
action.84 A regulation, for example, must go through a lengthy public
comment process or formal adjudication before it gains the force of
law.85 Once it does, courts will defer to the DOL’s interpretation as long
as (1) the statute has not unambiguously spoken to the issue and (2) the
interpretation is “a permissible construction” of the statute.86 This
process is known as “Chevron” deference, for the case from which it is
derived.87 If a court determines in the first step that the statute is clear on
its face, the DOL interpretation becomes irrelevant, and there is no need
to consider the second step.88 Informal guidance such as a WHD fact
sheet, however, does not proceed from notice and comment rulemaking
and is therefore only entitled to “Skidmore” deference: deference to the
extent courts find the guidance persuasive.89 As will be discussed in Part
II, the circuit courts have disagreed over how persuasive they find the
trainee test and Fact Sheet #71.90 The result is confusion as to how the
tests should be applied—and if they should even be applied at all.

82. Id. at n.1.
83. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
87. See, e.g., Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 225 (using the term “Chevron deference” and citing
Chevron, 467 U.S. 837).
88. Chevron, 467 U.S at 842–43.
89. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
90. See infra Part II.
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THE CIRCUIT COURTS ARE DIVIDED AS TO HOW TO
CLASSIFY INTERNS AND COMPARABLE WORKERS
UNDER THE FLSA

In the decades since Portland Terminal, Alamo Foundation, and the
publication of the WHD’s guidance, many of the federal appellate courts
have considered whether trainees, interns, and other similar individuals
are employees under the FLSA.91 These courts deliberated how much
deference to give the WHD’s guidance, how persuasive they found the
guidance, how to apply the six factors (if at all), and ultimately, which
test to use in classifying these workers.92
In Fox Searchlight, the Second Circuit became the first—and to date,
only—circuit court to specifically address interns in the context of FLSA
wage requirements.93 “Intern” certainly has a different connotation than
“trainee” or “extern,”94 but the similarities between the positions would
undoubtedly lead other circuits to look to their own precedent before
following the Fox Searchlight holding.95 The WHD’s guidance on
interns is modeled almost word-for-word after its guidance on trainees,96
and if a court previously found WHD guidance on trainees to be
persuasive, it seems likely it will do so again with WHD guidance on
interns.
91. Compare Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F. App’x 831 (11th Cir. 2013)
(granting deference), and Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993) (granting
deference), and Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 701 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1983) (granting deference),
with Glatt v. Fox Searchlight, Inc., 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2016) (no deference), and Solis v.
Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2011) (no deference), and McLaughlin
v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209 (4th Cir. 1989) (no deference).
92. See supra Part II.
93. Fox Searchlight, 811 F.3d at 535.
94. Compare Intern, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
intern [https://perma.cc/MQQ7-RRAZ] (defining “intern” as, among other things, “a student or
recent graduate who works for a period of time at a job in order to get experience”), with Trainee,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trainee [https://perma.cc/
ML3A-D5YY] (defining “trainee” as “one that is being trained especially for a job”); Jacquelyn
Smith, Externships: What They Are and Why They’re Important, FORBES (May 30, 2013),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacquelynsmith/2013/05/30/externships-what-they-are-and-whytheyre-important/#f85f84e5100c [https://perma.cc/42VN-PR7M] (describing externships as “shortterm, unpaid ‘shadowing’ experience[s]”). See also Fox Searchlight, 811 F.3d at 537–38
(concluding that the Portland Terminal test for trainees was inapplicable to modern internships).
95. See, e.g., Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 290–91 (2016) (declining
to follow Fox Searchlight and instead looking to its own precedent). Likewise, in its opinion on Fox
Searchlight, the Second Circuit neglected to cite to any other circuits’ precedent regarding
deference to the WHD test. Stephen E. Smith, Glatt v. Fox Searchlight and the Rhetorical Value of
Inter-Circuit Dialogue, 50 U.S.F. L. REV. F. 479, 485–87 (2016).
96. Compare Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8, with W&H MANUAL, supra note 8.
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The Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all found the WHD’s
guidance persuasive and relied upon the six-factor test.97 The Second,
Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have rejected WHD guidance and adopted
their own approaches, primarily centered around the “primary
beneficiary” of the work.98 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits fall
somewhere in between, choosing to home in on two of the WHD’s
factors: immediate benefit and agreement for compensation.99 Only the
First, Third, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have yet to explore this issue in
any depth post-Portland Terminal.100
This Comment is not intended to evaluate the merits of any particular
test noted within this Part. Rather, this Part will summarize the current,
muddled state of the law as applied to all internships, paving the way for
a discussion of nonprofit internships in Part III.
A.

The Fifth, Eleventh, and Tenth Circuits Embrace the WHD’s SixPart Test

Three circuits have granted some level of deference to the WHD and
directly applied the six-part test.101 Within this group a split exists
between those that believe all factors must be met to preclude employee
classification and those that do not.102

97. Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F. App’x 831, 834–35 (11th Cir. 2013);
Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1993); Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
701 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir. 1983).
98. Fox Searchlight, 811 F.3d at 536; Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518,
525 (6th Cir. 2011); McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209–10 n.2 (4th Cir. 1989).
99. Williams v. Strickland, 87 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1996); Donovan v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 726 F.2d 415, 417 (8th Cir. 1984).
100. The Seventh Circuit, however, did recently decline to apply the Second Circuit’s Fox
Searchlight test to student athletes on the grounds that the factors did not “take into account . . . the
reality of the student-athlete experience” and “‘fail[ed] to capture the true nature of the relationship’
between student athletes and their schools.” Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285,
291 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992)). The athletes
argued that they were analogous to interns; however, the court glossed over the idea of a multifactor
test and instead looked to DOL guidance with regard to treatment of college students participating
in extracurricular activities. Id. at 293. Berger will not be discussed in any detail in this Comment.
101. Atkins, 701 F.2d at 1128; Kaplan, 504 F. App’x at 834–35; Reich, 992 F.2d at 1026.
102. Compare Atkins, 701 F.2d at 1128, with Reich, 992 F.2d. at 1026.
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The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits Use an “All-or-Nothing”
Approach

The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have both looked to the WHD’s sixpart test and determined that an individual must meet all six factors to
avoid being an “employee.”103
The Fifth Circuit first took note of the six-part test in Donovan v.
American Airlines,104 a case involving airline trainees who were being
trained at a school affiliated with the employer company.105 The fact
pattern was substantially similar to that of Portland Terminal, so much
so that the court stated “if we return to the Portland Terminal opinion
and change the word ‘railroad’ to the word ‘airline,’ the decision fits this
case.”106 There, the WHD guidance was treated as almost supplementary
to a conclusion the court had already reached based on its own logic and
the parallelism with Portland Terminal.107
But a year after the Donovan decision, the Fifth Circuit faced a
similar case involving trainees that was not so straightforward. In Atkins
v. General Motors Corp.,108 the Court went immediately to the six-part
test, expressly stating that “the [WHD] Administrator’s interpretation is
entitled to substantial deference by this court.”109 Five of the six criteria
were already met in Atkins and were not in dispute.110 The fourth
criterion, regarding the employer receiving “no immediate advantage
from the trainees’ activities[,]” was the determinative issue.111 While the
court did not explicitly say that they were applying an all-or-nothing
approach to the test, the prior decision of the district court had stated that

103. Atkins, 701 F.2d at 1128; Kaplan, 504 F. App’x at 834–35.
104. Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 268 (5th Cir. 1982).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 272.
107. Id. at 273 (noting after reaching conclusion, “the Wage and Hour Administrator’s
interpretation of Portland Terminal supports the district court’s conclusion”).
108. 701 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1983).
109. Atkins, 701 F.2d at 1128. Because Atkins was decided prior to Chevron, the opinion does not
discuss or apply Chevron deference. It is, however, the only circuit-level precedent where a court
has found the WHD guidance entitled to the high level of deference now associated with Chevron.
The holding indicates that were Atkins to be decided post-Chevron, the court would still follow the
WHD guidance, but would do so from the sense that it found the guidance to be “persuasive.”
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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“the absence of any one of [the six factors] signals ‘employee’ status,”112
and the Fifth Circuit did not refute this interpretation.113
The Eleventh Circuit also looked to the WHD’s six-part test in
Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing and Coding.114 Kaplan is closer to the
unpaid intern debate than many of the “trainee” cases because it
involved students who were required to complete an externship while
enrolled at a medical billing college.115 Like the Fifth Circuit in
Donovan, the Kaplan Court treated the test as supplementary support of
its conclusion,116 which was based primarily off of an “economic
realities” test—a test that originated in the Fifth Circuit.117 While the
court did not expressly say that all six factors had to be met, a footnote
in the case includes the six factors and states that “[u]nder the
Administrator’s test, a trainee is not an ‘employee’ if these six factors
apply.”118 This footnote implied that if the test is to be applied, all
factors must be met.119
2.

The Tenth Circuit Uses a “Totality of the Circumstances”
Approach

Unlike the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the Tenth Circuit does not
require all six factors to be met to avoid “employee” status. Instead, the
circuit applies a “totality of the circumstances” approach, as
demonstrated in Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District.120
The case involved firefighter trainees who sought wages for the time
they were enrolled in the defendant’s training academy. 121 The trainees
met five of the six criteria but contended that they were employees
because there was an expectation of full-time work at the end of the
course.122 The relevant issues on appeal were (1) what test should be

112. Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 524 F. Supp. 307, 309 (W.D. La. 1981), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, 701 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1983).
113. Atkins, 701 F.2d at 1128.
114. 504 F. App’x 831 (11th Cir. 2013).
115. Id. at 832–33.
116. Id. at 834–35.
117. Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 676 F.2d 468, 470 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Weisel
v. Sing. Joint Venture, Inc., 602 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1979)).
118. Kaplan, 504 F. App’x at 834 n.2.
119. Id.
120. 992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993).
121. Id. at 1025.
122. Id. at 1026.
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applied to distinguish employees from trainees under the FLSA, and (2)
how strictly the WHD’s six-factor test should be applied.123
The Tenth Circuit found that the DOL was not entitled to a high level
of deference with regard to either the test or its interpretation of how the
test should be applied.124 The Court still concluded that the WHD test
was the “relevant[,] but not conclusive” test to differentiate trainees from
employees and that the district court had applied the proper legal
standard by using the test.125 The Court noted that “[t]he six criteria in
the Secretary’s test were derived almost directly from Portland
Terminal” and had consistently been used by both the WHD and other
courts.126 However, it was not persuaded to strictly apply an all-ornothing approach to the test because there was “nothing in Portland
Terminal to support” such an approach.127 The introductory language to
the WHD test further supported this view: “Whether trainees are
employees . . . will depend upon all of the circumstances surrounding
their activities on the premises of the employer.”128 Furthermore, the
court’s own precedent in the “analogous situation” of distinguishing an
independent contractor from an employee had used other “totality of the
circumstances” tests.129 Ultimately, the court determined firefighter
trainees were not employees, despite expecting full time employment at
the conclusion of the training course.130
B.

The Eighth and Ninth Circuits Look to Immediate Benefit and
Agreement for Compensation

Where the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits relied heavily on the
WHD test, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits seemed content to
acknowledge the test, then pick and choose which factors from it to
apply.
The Eighth Circuit has had little to say on the issue save for one case:
Donovan v. Trans World Airlines.131 The facts were substantially similar
to the Fifth Circuit’s case of Donovan v. American Airlines and involved

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 1024.
Id. at 1026.
Id. at 1027.
Id. at 1026.
Id.
Id. at 1027 (quoting W&H MANUAL, supra note 8).
Id. (quoting Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 805 (10th Cir.1989)).
Id. at 1029.
726 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1984).
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flight attendant trainees who received food, lodging, and other benefits
during a four-week training period.132 The district court looked to
American Airlines for guidance and acknowledged the WHD test, but its
read of the opinion focused primarily on who received the “immediate
benefit” of the work.133 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit mentioned the
district court’s conclusion that Trans World Airlines (TWA) trainees
were not employees “because TWA received no immediate benefit from
their efforts during training[]” and stated simply that “[a]fter careful
examination of the record, . . . we affirm on the basis of the district
court’s analysis.”134 Neither the district court nor court of appeals
expressly discussed what level of deference to give to the DOL or
whether they found the WHD test persuasive. The Eighth Circuit has not
explored the issue further in the twenty-plus years since this decision.
The Ninth Circuit heard a case similar to Alamo Foundation in
Williams v. Strickland.135 In Williams, the plaintiff was a resident at a
Salvation Army Adult Rehabilitation Center in San Francisco.136 As part
of his treatment program, Williams received room, board, counseling,
work therapy, and a small stipend (seven to twenty dollars per week) for
six months.137 After being dismissed from the program for drinking,
Williams sued the Salvation Army and alleged he was entitled to wages
for his services during work therapy.138
The majority looked to both Portland Terminal and Alamo
Foundation and focused on the latter’s holding: that the expectation of
benefits in exchange for services is the proper test in this case.139 It
found that Williams had neither an express nor implied agreement for
compensation and was therefore not an employee.140 The dissenting
judge, however, seemed to call attention to a question of economic
benefit, noting that “a material dispute of fact remained regarding the
Salvation Army’s claim that Williams’s labor was purely rehabilitative
and served only his own interest, producing no immediate economic

132. Id. at 416.
133. Donovan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 77-0881-CV-W-9, 1983 WL 2017, at *9 (W.D.
Mo. Mar. 4, 1983), aff’d, 726 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1984).
134. Trans World Airlines, 726 F.2d at 416–17.
135. 87 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1996).
136. Id. at 1065.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1067.
140. Id.
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benefit to the Salvation Army.”141 Neither the majority nor the dissent
referenced the WHD test.
While the Ninth Circuit has yet to expressly state that these two parts
make up the definitive employee test for the jurisdiction, at least one
lower court has interpreted the Williams holding as a dual test: (1)
whether the employer received an “immediate advantage” from the
individual’s work and (2) whether there was an express or implied
agreement for compensation.142 Other lower courts in the Ninth Circuit
have ignored the Williams holding entirely and arrived at the WHD test
after looking to more on-point cases in other circuits, such as American
Airlines and Atkins.143 In sum, it is not entirely clear which test the Ninth
Circuit has adopted.
C.

The Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits Reject WHD Guidance and
Focus on the “Primary Beneficiary” of the Individual’s Work

Unlike the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Second, Fourth,
and Sixth Circuits have not found WHD guidance persuasive. Instead
they have adopted their own tests, which primarily ask: Who is the
primary beneficiary of the possible employee’s work?
In 1989, the Fourth Circuit became the first federal court of appeals to
apply the “primary beneficiary” test to trainees, long before the Second
Circuit would put it to use in Fox Searchlight.144 That case, McLaughlin
v. Ensley,145 centered on “routemen”—workers who restocked vending
machines and sold snacks to retailers on behalf of a food distributor.146
Before being hired for a full-time position, potential routemen
participated in a weeklong, unpaid orientation period where they
shadowed current employees.147
The district court applied the six-part test and concluded that the
workers were not employees.148 But, on appeal, the Fourth Circuit
looked to its own precedent in interpreting Portland Terminal with

141. Id. at 1069 (Poole, J., dissenting).
142. Nance v. May Trucking Co., No. 3:12-CV-01655-HZ, 2014 WL 199136, at *5 (D. Or. Jan.
15, 2014).
143. See Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp., 753 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Ulrich v.
Alaska Airlines, Inc., No. C07-1215RSM, 2009 WL 364056, at *2–3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 2009).
144. McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209 (4th Cir. 1989).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1208.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1210.
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regard to underpaid workers.149 In those cases the court had held that
“when the employer received no immediate advantage from the trainees’
services, that is, when the principal purpose of the seemingly
employment relationship was to benefit the person in the employee
status, the worker could not be brought under the Act.”150 The court
looked to who was the “primary beneficiary” of the workers’ labor and
found that in the case of Ensley, it was the employer; therefore, the
workers were entitled to FLSA protection.151 The majority opinion’s
only comment on the lower court’s use of the six-part test was in a
footnote that stated “[w]e do not rely on the formal six-part test issued
by the Wage and Hour Division. Instead, because of the clear precedent
of [this court], we believe proper analysis derives from the principles
stated in those cases.”152 One judge from the panel dissented, saying that
the six-part test was the correct standard to apply because it was “a
reasonable application of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Portland
Terminal and entitled to deference.”153
More than twenty years later, the Sixth Circuit came up against the
issue in Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School.154 Laurelbrook, a
nonprofit corporation, operated a boarding high school and nursing
home facility (“the sanitarium”).155 Students at the school participated in
vocational courses, the curriculum of which included work at the
sanitarium.156 Laurelbrook operated the sanitarium purely for the
purposes of training students.157
In an excellent summary of this issue, the Sixth Circuit stated that
“[t]here is no settled test for determining whether a student is an
employee for purposes of the FLSA.”158 The district court did not
comment on the WHD’s test, instead concluding that under Portland
Terminal the appropriate question was whether the student or the school
received the primary benefit.159 The Sixth Circuit, however, did address

149. Id. at 1209.
150. Id. (quoting Isaacson v. Pa. Cmty. Servs., Inc., 450 F.2d 1306, 1309 (4th Cir. 1971))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
151. Id. at 1209–10.
152. Id. at 1209 n.2.
153. Id. at 1211 (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
154. 642 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2011).
155. Id. at 520.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 521.
159. Id.

17 - Pryjmak.docx (Do Not Delete)

1090

6/8/2017 11:07 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1071

the six-part test, acknowledging the myriad stances other courts had on
the subject.160 It found the “WHD’s test to be a poor method for
determining employee status in a training or educational setting[],”
noting that “it [was] overly rigid and inconsistent with a totality-of-thecircumstances approach,” and “inconsistent with Portland Terminal
itself.”161 And while the Court had previously “not directly spoken to the
issue,” it had “suggested that identifying the primary beneficiary of a
relationship [would provide] the appropriate framework for determining
employee status in the educational context.”162
In 2015, the Second Circuit decided the case at hand: Glatt v. Fox
Searchlight.163 In Fox Searchlight, plaintiffs were initially three
individuals working as unpaid interns either on the Fox Searchlight film
Black Swan, or in the corporate offices of Fox Searchlight (a for-profit
company).164 Two of the three were not enrolled in degree programs,
while the third was supposed to receive credit for her internship but
never did.165 Eventually, the district court certified two classes of
plaintiffs: New York State interns working at several Fox divisions and
nationwide interns working at those same divisions.166
The district court applied the WHD test under a “totality of the
circumstances” approach to determine whether the interns were
employees.167 The court found that four of the six factors weighed
toward plaintiffs being employees while the remaining two factors
weighed toward them being trainees.168 On this basis the lower court
found plaintiffs to be employees entitled to FLSA protection.169
On appeal, plaintiffs advocated for a test of whether or not the
employer receives “immediate advantage” from the interns’ work, while
defendants pushed for a primary beneficiary test.170 The DOL filed an
amicus brief defending the WHD test (now formulated in Fact Sheet
#71)171 along with an all-or-nothing approach to applying it.172 The
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 524–25.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 526 (citing Marshall v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 668 F.2d 234, 236 (6th Cir. 1981)).
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 531–32.
Id. at 532–33.
Id. at 533.
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Id. at 532–34.
Id. at 534.
Fox Searchlight, 811 F.3d at 535.
Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8.
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Second Circuit rejected the WHD test on the basis that it was only
entitled to Skidmore deference, and that it was “too rigid for [the court’s]
precedent to withstand” while “attempt[ing] to fit Portland Terminal’s
particular facts to all workplaces.”173 The court accepted the primary
beneficiary test because it focused “on what the intern receive[d] in
exchange for his work,” gave “courts the flexibility to examine the
economic reality as it exists between the intern and the employer,” and
“acknowledge[d] that the intern-employer relationship should not be
analyzed in the same manner as the standard employer-employee
relationship.”174 The court also suggested a list of non-dispositive factors
that could assist in making this determination:
1. The extent to which the intern and the employer clearly
understand that there is no expectation of compensation.
Any promise of compensation, express or implied, suggests
that the intern is an employee—and vice versa.
2. The extent to which the internship provides training that
would be similar to that which would be given in an
educational environment, including the clinical and other
hands-on training provided by educational institutions.
3. The extent to which the internship is tied to the intern’s
formal education program by integrated coursework or the
receipt of academic credit.
4. The extent to which the internship accommodates the
intern’s academic commitments by corresponding to the
academic calendar.
5. The extent to which the internship’s duration is limited to
the period in which the internship provides the intern with
beneficial learning.
6. The extent to which the intern’s work complements, rather
than displaces, the work of paid employees while providing
significant educational benefits to the intern.
7. The extent to which the intern and the employer understand
that the internship is conducted without entitlement to a
paid job at the conclusion of the internship.175

172.
173.
174.
175.

Fox Searchlight, 811 F.3d at 535–36.
Id. at 536.
Id.
Id. at 536–37.
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The court then remanded the case to the district court for further factfinding under the new test.176 In July 2016, Fox and the interns reached a
settlement agreement rather than return to trial.177
As this Part indicates, for all the excitement surrounding Fox
Searchlight, the law does not have one clear rule for internships.178 The
obvious place an employer would first look for guidance—the WHD—
cannot be relied upon in all jurisdictions.179 Currently any organization,
for-profit or nonprofit, that wishes to hire an intern must either pay them
or engage in a highly fact-specific inquiry based on the case law in its
jurisdiction.180 This inquiry may be further complicated for nonprofits
due to uncertainty surrounding a possible nonprofit exception.181
III. REGARDLESS OF THE TEST APPLIED TO FOR-PROFIT
INTERNS, NONPROFIT INTERNS MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER
A BROAD EXCEPTION FOR CHARITABLE NONPROFITS
While most recent discussion has focused on unpaid internships at
for-profit organizations, little has been written about their nonprofit
counterparts.182 Of the handful of scholarly pieces on the subject, only
one Note has commented on the issue since Fox Searchlight.183 The
WHD appears to support a broad nonprofit exception to intern wage
requirements, and some scholars agree that further legal support exists
for one.184 Others argue that in the wake of Fox Searchlight, no
exception exists and nonprofits will be held to the same standard as forprofits.185 Compelling policy interests stand on both sides of the
debate.186

176. Id. at 541.
177. Dominic Patten, Fox Settles ‘Black Swan’ Interns Lawsuit After Five Years, DEADLINE
HOLLYWOOD (July 12, 2016), http://deadline.com/2016/07/black-swan-intern-lawsuit-fox-settles1201785666/ [https://perma.cc/YVW3-2TNA].
178. See supra Part II.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Infra Part III.
182. See Harthill, supra note 15; Johnson, supra note 18; Pianko, supra note 20; Tucci, supra
note 20.
183. See Johnson, supra note 18. Johnson’s Note was published in June 2016, after the amended
Fox Searchlight opinion was published in January 2016.
184. See generally Harthill, supra note 15; Pianko supra note 20.
185. See generally Johnson, supra note 18.
186. Infra section III.C.
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This Part will first attempt to apply the current for-profit tests to
nonprofit internships and examine the effect this would have on
organizations. It will then summarize the legal and policy arguments for
and against a nonprofit exception, as articulated by scholars and other
sources.
A.

Applying the Circuits’ Tests to Nonprofit Interns Yields the Same
Confusion That It Does for Interns at For-Profits, but with More
Problematic Results

If no nonprofit exception exists, then nonprofits must evaluate their
internship programs under the applicable circuit’s test for interns
generally. As shown in Part II, the inquiry is very fact-specific, requires
knowledge of the case law in a given circuit, and is subject to varying
interpretation.
To demonstrate the potential results of the current tests, consider a
sample relationship between a nonprofit and its interns. The interns are
recent graduates working thirty hours per week at a small environmental
nonprofit. The nonprofit has four paid employees and two interns.
Neither intern is paid but both receive free, modest shared housing just
outside a high-rent area. The interns’ time is split between (1) shadowing
and assisting paid staff with regular programs of the organization; (2)
working on an intern-specific long-term project for the organization; and
(3) basic, sometimes menial, office tasks. While items (1) and (3) would
be completed by existing staff with or without the interns, item (2)
would not be unless an additional employee was hired. During the
internship, training is provided in many areas common to nonprofit
management, including fundraising, program development, community
interaction, and more. Internships are six months in length, but interns
often stay on up to a month longer than planned. The interns do not
expect a full-time job at the end of the internship, but the organization’s
executive director is well known in the sector and can make connections
for them afterward, pending good performance.
In the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, these interns are likely employees.
Because these circuits apply the all-or-nothing approach to the WHD
tests, all six factors must be met for organizations to avoid having to
comply with FLSA requirements.187 The interns receive educational
training and they benefit from the internship, in terms of experience,
skills development, and networking. The interns know they are not
187. Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F. App’x 831, 834–35 (11th Cir. 2013);
Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 701 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir. 1983).
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entitled to a full-time position. However, it is debatable whether the
nonprofit derives immediate advantage from the interns or if the interns
would be deemed to displace regular employees, given the internspecific project. Additionally, it is unclear how a court would rule on the
agreement to wages question. Here there is no expectation of payment,
but in-kind benefits in the form of housing are expected and exchanged.
Given the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Portland Terminal that
“implied compensation agreement[s]” could create an employment
relationship,188 and the follow up in Alamo Foundation that in-kind
benefits created an implied agreement and were just “wages in another
form,”189 a court could very easily interpret “wages” broadly and
conclude that this factor was met here. So, meeting all six factors would
be a challenge for this internship program.
The nonprofit might have better luck under the Tenth Circuit’s totality
of the circumstances approach, where all six factors are not necessary. 190
One could argue that the educational components, benefit to intern, and
temporary nature of the internship are enough to outweigh the other
factors. Still, it is even less clear here than in the all-or-nothing
approach, as it is impossible to accurately predict which factors the court
might prioritize over others.
In the Eighth or Ninth Circuits, where agreement to compensation and
immediate benefit are the determining factors,191 the interns would
probably be deemed employees, but again, the outcome is unclear. As
noted above, there is certainly room for debate on both counts.
Finally, the organization might have its best luck in the Second,
Fourth, or Sixth Circuits. Focusing on the “primary beneficiary” still
creates an open question, but there is a solid argument for the intern
receiving the primary benefit here. The Fox Searchlight factors do not
all work in the organization’s favor—most notably, those tying the
internship to an academic program either by credit or the calendar
year—but the Second Circuit itself has said that these factors are nondispositive.192
Regardless of the test applied, one thing is obvious: It takes a lawyer
to make sense of it, and even then, there is still room for an argument on

188. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947).
189. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985).
190. Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1993).
191. Williams v. Strickland, 87 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1996); Donovan v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 726 F.2d 415, 416–17 (8th Cir. 1984).
192. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 537 (2d Cir. 2016).
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both sides.193 Many nonprofits lack the resources to hire an attorney to
help appropriately structure their internship program and do not want to
risk a potential lawsuit.194 This sets such nonprofits apart from forprofits, where the risk trade-off may be more palatable. Unless they are
exempt from the murky tests, nonprofits are then left with two options:
Pay interns, or do not have interns at all. The policy implications of
these results will be further considered in section III.C.
B.

Scholars Disagree Whether a Broad Nonprofit Exception Exists
Under Current Law

A variety of legal arguments have been made both in support of and
against the existence of an exception for all nonprofits.195 While no
positive law expressly states such an exception, a court would likely
consider many of these arguments if the question of a nonprofit
exception were left up to judicial determination.
1.

Pianko and Harthill Argue That a Nonprofit Exception Exists

The majority of scholars who have written on nonprofit internships
have argued for an exception; however, their commentary pre-dates Fox
Searchlight.196 Still, given the disarray among the circuits explored in
Part II, many if not all of the authors’ arguments below remain viable
and warrant consideration. Three scholars have explored the issue in
some level of depth: Anthony J. Tucci, who examined it broadly;197
Susan Harthill, who focused on unpaid internships among law
students;198 and Maurice Pianko, who discussed internships at nonprofit
newsmagazines.199

193. See Interns: Employee or Volunteer, NAT’L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, https://www.council
ofnonprofits.org/tools-resources/interns-employee-or-volunteer
[https://perma.cc/H4KT-JNC5];
Megan H. Mann & David R. Warner, Turns Out, There’s No Such Thing As “Free Labor” Either:
Why Most Employers Should be Paying Interns or Modifying/Abandoning Their Unpaid Internship
Programs, VENABLE LLP: LABOR AND EMP’T ALERT (June 2010), https://www.venable.com/
files/Publication/49ba8983-c152-420b-a574-4fa0d1bf37bd/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
0a202d50-8f59-415e-96da-521aa6430a13/Internships.pdf [https://perma.cc/TT3T-2KRV].
194. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1154.
195. See generally Harthill, supra note 15; Johnson, supra note 18; Pianko, supra note 20.
196. Harthill, supra note 15 (published in 2014); Pianko, supra note 20 (published in 2014);
Tucci, supra note 20 (published in 2012).
197. Tucci, supra note 20.
198. Harthill, supra note 15.
199. Pianko, supra note 20.
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The most straightforward argument is that where the WHD test (and
by extension, presumably Fact Sheet #71) has been considered
persuasive, the footnoted statement—that unpaid internships at
nonprofits are generally permissible—would also be considered
persuasive enough for courts to follow. But as shown in Part II, only a
handful of circuit courts have embraced the WHD test.200 If the Supreme
Court were to resolve the circuit split in favor of the WHD, a nonprofit
exception would almost be guaranteed. Alternatively, if the WHD ever
decided to put Fact Sheet #71 through notice and comment proceedings,
the included exception would be entitled to Chevron deference and hold
more weight in all the circuit courts.201 No scholar has explicitly made
this argument for a nonprofit exception, although Thomas Johnson relied
on the Second Circuit finding a lack of persuasiveness to effectively
argue the opposite.202
In the alternative, Maurice Pianko argues that the DOL’s
interpretation of the FLSA is irrelevant to nonprofit internships because
under step one of a Chevron analysis, the statute has unambiguously
provided that nonprofits may legally refrain from paying intern
volunteers.203 In Portland Terminal and Alamo Foundation, he says, “the
Supreme Court . . . interpreted the [FLSA] to mean that unpaid intern
volunteers [at nonprofits] are legal because such volunteers without
promise or expectation of compensation, but solely for their own
pleasure, labor in the service of a cause that they believe in.”204 Pianko
concludes that the Court’s statements in Portland Terminal and Alamo
Foundation—that “any person who, solely for his personal purpose or
pleasure, worked in activities (such as charities) was not an employee
who had to be paid the minimum wage under the [FLSA]”—indicate
that the Court viewed the question as one of law that Congress had
already spoken to.205 Therefore, the Court decided that unpaid nonprofit
interns were allowed under the first step of Chevron, and there was no
need to determine whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute was
a permissible construction under the second step.206
Susan Harthill argues that unpaid interns at nonprofits fall under the
FLSA’s volunteer exception in spite of the lack of an express exemption
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Supra Part II.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001).
Johnson, supra note 18, at 1140–41.
Pianko, supra note 20, at 36.
Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 32–33 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
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for nonprofits outside of food banks.207 She states that the DOL has
applied the exemption to other types of nonprofits through opinion
letters and “courts have accepted this view.”208 Therefore, “nonprofits
should remain safe from the threat of lawsuits.”209 That said, there is
currently no clear line as to when nonprofit interns fall under the
umbrella of nonprofit volunteers and when they do not. But, notes
Harthill, “the DOL has consistently taken the position that volunteers
include individuals who provide services to nonprofits . . . . [I]nterns at
nonprofit organizations are thus probably considered ‘volunteers,’ but
they fall into an illusory exemption.”210
Harthill admits that her position is somewhat weak given the Sixth
Circuit’s decision to ignore the volunteer exception in its discussion of
the nonprofit corporation in Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium and
School211 and the nonbinding nature of the DOL’s opinion letters.212
However, her argument appears to be the prevailing view in favor of a
nonprofit exception for interns.213 The congressional record of the
discussion behind the food bank amendment further supports this
position.214 The record shows the bill’s sponsor stating that the
amendment “should not be in any way construed to mean
that . . . Congress is showing an intent that any other individual who
performs community services and receives benefits is an employee,” and
a supporter responding that “[t]his incident [was] just one example of the
fact that the Fair Labor Standards Act is flexible, [and] the Fair Labor
Standards Act will yield to common sense after due deliberation.”215 If
the FLSA was intended to be flexible, its flexibility may allow it to
encompass not only more than the expressly mentioned nonprofits, but
also individuals who serve them for no pay and with a title other than
“volunteer.”

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Harthill, supra note 15, at 660–62.
Id. at 601.
Id.
Id.
642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 582–84.
Id. at 601.
144 CONG. REC. H5386 (daily ed. June 25, 1998).
Id. (statements of Reps. Ballenger and Owens).
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Johnson Argues That a Nonprofit Exception Does Not Exist

The primary scholarly voice against a nonprofit exception comes in a
2016 Note by Thomas Johnson.216 Johnson argues that the exception
rests on unstable legal ground, particularly following the outcome of Fox
Searchlight.217 However, he neglects to take notice of the current circuit
split demonstrated in Part II.218
Johnson correctly points out that “[t]here is no positive law that
suggests that unpaid interns at nonprofits are not ‘employees’ for the
purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act.”219 The only text of the FLSA
related to nonprofits provides a limited exception for those who
volunteer at public agencies or nonprofit food banks.220 This exception
was created after the Supreme Court articulated a broad exception in
Alamo Foundation and would seem to indicate Congressional intent to
narrow the exception; however, as discussed above, the legislative
history is somewhat less clear on this point.221 Regardless, outside of the
three examples provided in the Alamo Foundation exception and the
situation at issue in the case,222 it is unclear where the Court would draw
a line between ordinary volunteerism and employee activities absent
definitive legislative or agency action.
Johnson also points to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Alamo
Foundation for support of his argument, given the Second Circuit’s
reliance on it.223 He notes that the Alamo Foundation Court “directly
rejected a blanket volunteer exception to the Fair Labor Standards Act
for charitable nonprofits” and that “[i]f the Second Circuit found the
logic of Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation persuasive in the context of
unpaid interns at for-profit entities, it is highly likely that this precedent
would weigh heavily . . . against the blanket intern exception for
charitable nonprofits found in Fact Sheet #71.”224 Johnson interprets the
216. Johnson, supra note 18.
217. Id. at 1128–29.
218. Id. at 1139–43.
219. Id. at 1140.
220. Fair Labor Standards of Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(5) (2012).
221. Alamo Foundation was decided in 1985, while the FLSA amendment was passed in 1998.
See discussion supra section III.B.1.
222. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302–03 (1985)
(differentiating between “volunteers who drive the elderly to church, serve church suppers, or help
remodel a church home for the needy” and self-described “volunteers” in the commercial ventures
of a nonprofit).
223. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1142.
224. Id.
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Alamo Foundation holding as saying that nonprofits and for-profits
should be treated identically under the FLSA.225
Johnson references the same conflicting legislative history as Harthill,
but frames it from the perspective of the DOL’s inconsistent guidance on
the subject.226 The Department indicates in Fact Sheet #71 that one of
the key factors in the intern or employee question is whether the intern
displaces paid employees.227 But in a later opinion letter, the Department
stated that “even when volunteers do not displace paid labor at a
nonprofit, if it is the type of labor that a for-profit competitor would have
to pay for, the workers cannot be classified as volunteers.”228 Despite the
fact that this is discussing volunteers rather than interns, this seems to be
directly at odds with the Fact Sheet #71 footnote regarding unpaid
nonprofit internships as “permissible.”229 Johnson points out that “these
agency positions are only entitled” to persuasive deference under
Skidmore and claims that “they undermine the argument that the Labor
Department would support preferential treatment for charitable
nonprofits under the volunteer exception.”230
From Johnson’s perspective, the only thing keeping unpaid nonprofit
internships afloat is Fact Sheet #71.231 As mentioned earlier, Fact Sheet
#71 focuses primarily on unpaid internships at for-profits, but it includes
a footnote stating that unpaid nonprofit internships are “generally
permissible.”232 Johnson argues that because Fact Sheet #71 was thrown
out by the Second Circuit, the belief in a nonprofit exception has nothing
left to stand on:
Fox Searchlight signals that nonprofits can no longer safely rely
on Fact Sheet #71’s conclusory assertion as a bulwark against
liability. Even the Labor Department conceded that Fact Sheet
#71 is limited to the “power to persuade.” This should be highly
disconcerting to charitable nonprofits, as the Labor
Department’s attempts at persuasion failed at both the district
225. Id. at 1143 (following discussions of reliance on Alamo Foundation and Portland Terminal
with the statement that “Fox Searchlight supports, in one additional way, the argument that courts
will obey the Supreme Court’s guidance in Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation to treat for-profits and
nonprofits identically”).
226. Id. at 1147.
227. Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8.
228. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1147 (citing Volunteers/Employee Status, 6A WAGE & HOUR
MANUAL (BNA), at WHM99:8191, 99:8191–92 (Nov. 9, 1998)).
229. Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8.
230. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1147.
231. Id. at 1140–41.
232. Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8.
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court and circuit court levels in Fox Searchlight. There is no
reason to think that the Labor Department’s terse assertion in a
footnote will be more persuasive to courts than its developed,
six-factor internship test that drew on over fifty years of agency
interpretation and enforcement.233
This is a bold statement, for it presumes that “the Labor Department’s
attempts at persuasion”234 will fail at all circuit courts because they
failed before the Second Circuit. As shown in Part II, several circuit
courts have found the WHD’s trainee test persuasive enough to rely
upon,235 and the WHD trainees test is nearly identical to
Fact Sheet # 71.236 It is likely that at least those courts would find Fact
Sheet #71 persuasive enough to follow, including the footnote reference
to nonprofits.
C.

A Broad Exception Furthers Certain Policy Goals While Inhibiting
Others

Regardless of whether or not an exception currently exists, the
question remains of whether one should. The true merits of the
charitable sector are a subject of considerable debate237 and are beyond
the scope of this Comment. This debate extends to the idea of exempting
nonprofit internships from FLSA compliance.238 Still, Congress has
determined that charities deserve subsidies, and that policy underlies the
decision to exempt them from certain legal requirements.239 The
question then becomes, how far should that exemption go? Considering
the policy grounds of a broad exception forces an evaluation of who is
more deserving: nonprofits, or the interns who serve them.

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Johnson, supra note 18, at 1140–41.
Id. at 1140.
See supra section II.A.
Compare Fact Sheet #71, supra note 8, with W&H MANUAL, supra note 8.
See, e.g., GILBERT M. GAUL & NEILL A. BOROWSKI, FREE RIDE: THE TAX-EXEMPT
ECONOMY 1–9 (1993) (noting that nonprofits subsidize inefficiency, hide wealth, and suffer from
mission drift); Miranda Perry Fleischer, How Is an Opera Like a Soup Kitchen?, in THE
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TAX LAW 256 (Monica Bhandari ed., 2017) (examining the
paradox of the nonprofit tax exemption equally subsidizing both charities that serve the wealthy,
like operas, and those that serve the poor, like soup kitchens).
238. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1158–62.
239. Perry Fleischer, supra note 237, at 256–62.
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The Positive: A Broad Exception Furthers the Beneficial Work of
the Nonprofit Sector and Provides More Opportunities for Interns
Interested in Public Service

A broad exception favors nonprofits and the policy interests they
serve. The nonprofit, “independent,” or “third” sector has been widely
regarded as an important gap-filler between the government and private
sectors.240 Writes John Gardner, “Unlike government, an independent
sector group need not ascertain that its idea or philosophy is supported
by some large constituency, and unlike the business sector they do not
need to pursue only those ideas which will be profitable.”241 The
freedom from these two constraints thus allows nonprofits to meet
societal needs that might otherwise go unaddressed, or to respond more
quickly to issues where government bureaucracy would increase reaction
time.242 This is to say nothing of the more philosophical argument for a
nonprofit sector: that the existence of one is “uniquely American” and
rooted in a long national philanthropic tradition.243
The importance of this third sector begets a major policy argument for
a nonprofit exception. If nonprofits are intended to fill a gap left by the
for-profit market, then they should not be subjected to market forces
with regard to labor.244 Many nonprofits are low-budget organizations
that simply cannot afford to pay interns.245 Requiring them to do so
could result in nonprofits substantially reducing or even cutting
internship programs entirely.246 In some cases, where interns provide a
cost-effective way to advance the mission of the organization,
240. LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 12–13 (2d ed. 1999).
241. John W. Gardner, The Independent Sector, in AMERICA’S VOLUNTARY SPIRIT ix, xiii (Brian
O’Connell ed., 1983).
242. Id. at xiii–xiv.
243. Id. at ix; see also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 975 (Henry Reeve
trans., Auckland, The Floating Press 2009) (1840). De Tocqueville, in his 1835 tour of the United
States, noted the presence and value of philanthropic ideals to the fledgling country:
It would seem as if every imagination in the United States were upon the stretch to invent
means of increasing the wealth and satisfying the wants of the public. The best-informed
inhabitants of each district constantly use their information to discover new truths which may
augment the general prosperity; and if they have made any such discoveries, they eagerly
surrender them to the mass of the people.
Id.
244. Pianko, supra note 20, at 39.
245. Kate Newman, For Interns at Nonprofits, Don’t Expect a Paycheck, ALJAZEERA AM. (Aug.
25, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/8/25/nonprofit-interns.html [https://perma.cc/
C4DR-G8AN]; see also infra tbl.2 (showing roughly fifty percent of nonprofits have less than
$100,000 in annual revenues or assets).
246. Newman, supra note 245.
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eliminating internships could effectively serve to reduce the power and
reach of the nonprofit itself.247 Smaller organizations are likely to feel
these effects the hardest—and they are the nonprofits who arguably are
best positioned to achieve the goals of the third sector, as they tend to be
nimbler and better attuned to local needs.248
Forcing all nonprofits to pay interns would hinder not only
organizations, but individuals seeking internships as well. While the
focus of most discussion on the topic has been primarily on
compensation-related benefits to interns, requiring payment would result
in a tradeoff: fewer internships would be available, meaning fewer
intangible benefits for interns.249 Furthermore, a lack of available
positions could be a deterrent for possible interns otherwise interested in
a career in public service.250
2.

The Negative: A Broad Exception Causes Inefficiency and
Uncertainty While Perpetuating Income Inequality

Broadly exempting nonprofits may advance nonprofit missions, but it
raises policy concerns about the treatment of interns. Johnson pays heed
to many of the policy arguments in favor of a nonprofit exception but
also notes that “[t]he debate regarding the character of nonprofit
organizations has raged for decades,” as to whether nonprofits “combine
the civic and charitable qualities of government with the innovation and
ingenuity of the private sector,” or “hid[e] wealth, subsidiz[e]
inefficiencies, and suffer[] from chronic ‘mission drift.’”251 He points to

247. See, e.g., BARRY HESSENIUS, HARDBALL LOBBYING FOR NONPROFITS: REAL ADVOCACY
NEW CENTURY 93 (2007) (“Unpaid internships . . . are an excellent way to
provide [a] struggling advocacy organization with some of the help it requires.”); Interns: Employee
or Volunteer, supra note 193 (“Interns can be terrific additions to a nonprofit’s capacity building
journey . . . .”); Would College Interns Help Your Nonprofit?, GELMAN, ROSENBERG, & FREEDMAN
(June 4, 2012), http://www.grfcpa.com/resources/articles/would-college-interns-help-your-nonprofit/
[https://perma.cc/B9CT-FCTJ] (“[S]tudents at the master’s level may be available to do a research
project for you that would normally cost tens of thousands of dollars.”).
248. Melissa Kushner, Small Nonprofits, Big Nonprofits: The Where to Give Dilemma,
HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (July 30, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/melissa-kushner/
small-nonprofits-big-nonp_b_7905482.html [https://perma.cc/5PL7-VDKK] (“[S]mall nonprofits
tend to bring an intimacy with the challenges faced in particular communities, which are culturally
specific and unique.”); Marc Koenig, Famous Nonprofits Are Overrated: Three Advantages of
Being a Small Nonprofit, NONPROFIT HUB (Feb. 18, 2013), http://nonprofithub.org/nonprofitmarketing-plan/advantages-of-being-a-small-nonprofit/ [https://perma.cc/QV84-8L78] (noting
“agility” as one of the advantages of a small nonprofit).
249. Rotherham, supra note 14.
250. Id.
251. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1151–52.
FOR NONPROFITS IN THE
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three primary policy concerns implicated by a possible exception: (1)
inefficiency, (2) uncertainty, and (3) economic inequality.252
Johnson argues that allowing unpaid internships in the nonprofit
sector leads to income stratification because it “privileges the upper
class.”253 He points to the growth of intern placement agencies, which
essentially require students to pay to have an unpaid internship, and the
fact that students from wealthy families are more likely to have the
economic support necessary to take on an unpaid internship.254 Johnson
also alleges that nonprofits suffer from these effects as well because they
are screening for interns with wealthy backgrounds rather than the best
possible employees, and in the long run, this practice will discourage
low-income applicants from later involvement in the nonprofit sector.255
Nonprofits may be viewed as inefficient because while they are
deemed a “gap-filler” (providing public goods where both the market
and government have failed), in filling this gap they curtail profit motive
and reduce incentives for cost efficiency.256 According to one statistic,
the nonprofit sector “wastes $100 billion . . . annually” and some
scholars argue that “the unregulated status of nonprofits allows
inefficient entrepreneurs, who would be driven out of the for-profit
market, to survive and draw a salary as long as they adopt nonprofit
status.”257 Given these concerns, some have concluded that leveling the
playing field between for-profits and nonprofits is necessary.258
Allowing nonprofits a broad exception for unpaid interns would do the
opposite.259
Johnson says that the current uncertainty surrounding the FLSA
further compounds this inefficiency.260 The uncertainty leaves nonprofits
with few options, none of which are particularly desirable:

252. Id. at 1152–58.
253. Id. at 1155.
254. Id. at 1155–58; see also Christopher Zara, Paying a Fee to Work for Free: Pricey Intern
Placement Agencies Raise Eyebrows Among Fair Wage Advocates, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 12,
2014), http://www.ibtimes.com/paying-fee-work-free-pricey-intern-placement-services-raise-eyebrows among-fair-wage-1686392 [https://perma.cc/38UF-T2ED].
255. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1156. However, Johnson cites no support for this assertion.
256. Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 507
(1981).
257. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1152–53 (citing Bill Bradley et al., The Nonprofit Sector’s $100
Billion Opportunity, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2003, at 94, 102; Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The
Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2054 (2007)).
258. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1153–55.
259. Id. at 1154.
260. Id.
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Nonprofits must either pay their interns (which is possibly
unnecessary), structure their internships to avoid liability under
any of the plausible tests for the intern exception (which is
tricky), place their faith in the narrowly drawn volunteer
exception (which is risky), or rely on the Labor Department’s
assertion in a footnote merely entitled to Skidmore deference
that unpaid internships are “generally permissible.” Each of
these choices has consequences, and a misstep could subject
nonprofits to liability for unpaid wages.261
In sum, Johnson’s point is that acting as though there is a nonprofit
exception when there is no clear statement from either Congress or the
Supreme Court will only result in money flowing to lawyers rather than
mission-oriented nonprofit activities.262 Whatever the line is, it needs to
be drawn by Congress.263
This Part has shown that neither applying the same standard to
nonprofits as for-profits nor broadly exempting nonprofits from that
standard is ideal. To move forward, a clear rule is needed—preferably
one that balances both nonprofit and intern concerns.
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE FLSA TO INCLUDE A
NARROW, TAX LAW-BASED EXCEPTION FOR INTERNS
AT CERTAIN NONPROFITS
Most scholars writing about unpaid nonprofit intern have focused on
making an argument for or against a nonprofit exception under current
court holdings and DOL guidance.264 Only one, Anthony Tucci, made a
totally new proposal: to establish a nonprofit-specific test, along the
lines of those articulated in Fact Sheet #71 or Fox Searchlight.265 But
Tucci’s test was still designed to apply to all nonprofits.266 No scholar
has yet explored the idea of a bright-line exception that only applies to
some nonprofits. This Part will explain why a narrowly tailored
exception makes sense from both a legal and policy standpoint and will
propose three possible narrow exceptions based on type, activities, or
size of organization.

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1154–55.
See id.; Harthill, supra note 15; Pianko, supra note 20.
See generally Tucci, supra note 20.
Id.
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A Narrowly-Tailored Exception Is Preferable to a Broad One

As shown in Part III, the question around a possible nonprofit
exception has up to this point been, “Does it exist or not?” It demands a
blanket yes or no: Either a rule applies to all nonprofits, or it applies to
none. But this question is inherently problematic under existing case law
and legislative history, and it neglects to take notice of the extreme
diversity present in the nonprofit sector. A narrow, non-blanket
exception, however, would conform with current law and balance many
of the conflicting policy goals articulated in Part III.
1.

Alamo Foundation and Legislative History Support an Exception,
but Not a Blanket One

The text of the FLSA, its legislative history, and Supreme Court
precedent all suggest an exception for nonprofits. But all three indicate a
strong push against a blanket exception.
As discussed earlier, the text of FLSA does contain the basis for some
form of a nonprofit exception.267 But despite the push from scholars, the
DOL, and even the Supreme Court to create a more expansive exception,
what remains in the text is very limited: private, nonprofit food banks.268
This exception remained narrow despite congressional discussion that it
was not intended to be exclusive.269 If anything, this shows that future
legislative action on the FLSA may come in the form of narrow
exceptions, rather than broad ones.
Similarly, in Alamo Foundation, the Supreme Court rejected a blanket
exemption on the basis of legislative history.270 The Court cited the
Senate Committee report and Congressional Record from the bill that
expanded the FLSA to include enterprise coverage.271 These documents
indicate that “the activities of nonprofit groups were excluded from
coverage only insofar as they were not performed for a ‘business
purpose,’” and that a proposed floor amendment was debated that would
have expressly excluded 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations from the
“employer” definition.272 The amendment was rejected on the grounds
267. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(5) (2012).
268. 144 CONG. REC. H5386 (daily ed. June 25, 1998) (statements of Reps. Ballenger and
Owens).
269. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1985).
270. Id.
271. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 297 (referencing 106 CONG. REC. 16704 (1960) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy)).
272. Id. at 297 (quoting 106 CONG. REC. 16704 (1960) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)).
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that it would broaden the exception too far and would allow a
“‘profitmaking corporation or company’ owned by ‘an eleemosynary
institution’” to be exempt from FLSA requirements.273 While this may
not be perfect evidence of Congress’ intent, the Court relied on this
information to conclude that Congress did not mean to broadly exclude
nonprofits from enterprise coverage under the FLSA.274 While this
Comment is not particularly concerned with enterprise coverage, the
Alamo Foundation decision indicates a Supreme Court preference
toward a non-blanket exemption.
Thomas Johnson’s Note makes many great points about the current
status of the nonprofit exception, but in his comments on Alamo
Foundation, he overlooks an important distinction. Whereas Johnson
states the Supreme Court’s guidance in the case is to “treat for-profits
and nonprofits identically,”275 the Court actually only stated that
nonprofits and for-profits should be treated identically so far as their
activities mirror each other—namely, when those activities are
commercial in nature.276 As will be discussed further in sections IV.B
and IV.C.1, this position with regard to commercial activities tracks an
important distinction the Internal Revenue Service makes in its treatment
of tax-exempt organizations, and one that may be used as a guidepost for
other possible narrow exceptions.
2.

A Narrow Exception Accounts for the Diversity of Tax-Exempt
Organizations and Balances Competing Policy Aims

A narrow exception not only has legal support; put simply, it makes
sense. Unlike a broad exception, a narrow exception takes notice of the
diverse nature of tax-exempt organizations and allows for some, but not
all, to have unpaid interns. By crafting such an exception, Congress
could create a “scalpel” rather than a “cleaver,” effectively balancing
pro-intern and pro-nonprofit policy goals.
People frequently underestimate the diversity of the nonprofit sector
or misunderstand the scope and definition of the term.277 An
273. Id. at 298 (quoting 106 CONG. REC. 16704 (1960) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)).
274. Id. at 299.
275. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1143.
276. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 297–99.
277. See Myths About Nonprofits, NAT’L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, https://www.councilof
nonprofits.org/myths-about-nonprofits [https://perma.cc/6JDA-SDY6]. Compare Allison Gauss, Is
It Time to Ditch the Word “Nonprofit”?, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (June 13, 2016),
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/is_it_time_to_ditch_the_word_nonprofit [https:// perma.cc/7QES68GA], with Jim Schaffer, Can We Stop Arguing over “Nonprofit”?, NONPROFIT Q. (June 20,
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organization can be a “nonprofit” at the state level without being taxexempt federally.278 Among those organizations granted federal tax
exemption, there is still a great deal of diversity. Section 501 of the U.S.
Code provides tax exemptions for no less than twenty-eight different
types of organizations, including social welfare organizations,279
chambers of commerce,280 fraternal organizations,281 credit unions,282
cemeteries,283 and more.284 The diversity among, and even within, these
types of organizations has led some scholars to question the merits of
granting them tax exemption.285
The most well-known entities from these categories are 501(c)(3)
organizations, which are operated for a limited set of purposes such as
charitable, religious, educational, literary, and other objectives.286 These
are generally referred to as “charitable nonprofits” and are essentially the
only tax-exempt organizations to which donations are eligible for a tax
deduction.287 Although scholars and politicians do not always say so
explicitly, most discussions around a potential exception to the FLSA
focus only on an exception for charitable nonprofits.288
2016),
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2016/06/20/can-we-stop-arguing-over-nonprofit/
[https://perma.cc/ESJ9-5SDQ] (debating the suitability of the term “nonprofit” to describe the
sector).
278. Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate
Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 57 (1981); What Is the Difference Between Nonprofit, Tax
Exempt, and Charitable?, IRS STAY EXEMPT (last updated Feb. 21, 2015), https://www.stay
exempt.irs.gov/Resource-Library/What-is-the-difference-between-nonprofit-tax-exempt-andcharitable [https://perma.cc/ZV7X-U824]; see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 24.03.015 (2016)
(providing for the incorporation of nonprofit corporations at the state level in Washington State).
279. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2012).
280. Id. § 501(c)(6).
281. Id. § 501(c)(8).
282. Id. § 501(c)(14).
283. Id. § 501(c)(13).
284. See id. § 501(c)(1)–(29).
285. See, e.g., Perry Fleischer, supra note 237, at 256 (considering the charitable merits of the
opera, in comparison to the soup kitchen).
286. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
287. Id. § 170(a)(1), (c)(2). Gifts to other entities are deductible on the following limited bases:
(1) a state or the United States, or any subdivision thereof if the gift is for exclusively public
purposes; (2) a veterans’ organization, so long as no part of its net earnings “inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder”; (3) a fraternal organization, if the gift is used exclusively for the charitable
purposes outlined in § 501(c)(3); or (4) a cemetery company, which is not operated for profit and is
owned and operated solely for its members’ benefit. Id. § 170(c)(1), (3)–(5).
288. See, e.g., 106 CONG. REC. 16703 (1960) (statements of Sen. Goldwater and Sen. Kennedy)
(debating the merits of Sen. Goldwater’s proposed amendment that would “specifically exclude
from the term ‘enterprise’ any employer exempt from taxation under section 501(c) (3) of the
Internal Revenue Code”); Harthill, supra note 15, at 605; Johnson, supra note 18, at 1129–32; Lisa
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But even 501(c)(3) organizations are divided further by the
International Revenue Service (IRS). Some organizations are designated
“private foundations” while others are “public charities,” a distinction
that turns on how the organization operates and from where it receives
its support.289 There are member organizations and nonmember
organizations.290 Then there is possibly the most important differentiator
of all: size, in terms of both impact and budget. Where some nonprofits
are operating with budgets in the tens and hundreds of millions of
dollars, more than half have annual revenues of less than $100,000.291
This diversity is actually helpful because it enables line-drawing in a
way that can balance policy interests far better than a broad exception. A
broad exception forces us to ask, “Should we resolve this at the expense
of the intern or the organization?” No one wants to see interns taken
advantage of, but they also do not want to inhibit the positive
contributions nonprofits make to society. A narrow exception can
instead cut along already existing lines to provide more leeway to
nonprofits that actually need it, while taking care of interns as much as
possible. As explored further in sections IV.B and IV.C, these bright
lines already exist in a statute familiar to nonprofits: the Internal
Revenue Code.
B.

Tax Law Provides a Simple, Clear, and Supported Basis for a
Narrow Exception

The Internal Revenue Code offers a clear, easy route to implementing
a narrow nonprofit exception with bright-line rules that support policy
goals. This route makes even more sense given the structure of the
FLSA, Supreme Court precedent, and the Code’s existing relationship to
nonprofits.
Admittedly, clarity is not usually what people think of when they
think about tax law. The Tax Code on the whole is extremely complex

M. Milani, The Applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Volunteer Workers at Nonprofit
Organizations, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 223, 237–38 (1986); Tucci, supra note 20, at 1385
(“Under the proposed limited-service-exemption prong, work typically associated with publicservice volunteerism is intentionally broad. It allows a bona fide unpaid intern to volunteer his or
her ‘services needed to carry out [the nonprofit’s] charitable, educational, or religious programs.’”).
289. I.R.C. § 509(a) (providing all 501(c)(3) organizations are classified as private foundations
unless they fall into one of four exceptions); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.509(a)-2–(a)-4 (2016) (explaining the
four exceptions).
290. See Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3 (2016) (allowing membership fees to be included in the
“support test” establishing a 501(c)(3) as a public charity).
291. Infra tbl.2.

17 - Pryjmak.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

6/8/2017 11:07 AM

A TAX-BASED EXCEPTION FOR NONPROFIT INTERNS

1109

with layers upon layers of rules and exceptions.292 But several of the
parts that apply to nonprofits are very straightforward. These include the
split between private foundations and public charities,293 annual filing
requirements,294 and paying tax on income from commercial activities.295
They are bright-line rules that have stood the test of time. And as the
following section will explore, these rules balance key policy concerns
explored in Part III.
In addition to its clarity on the subject, the Tax Code makes sense to
use in conjunction with the FLSA because the FLSA is already a “taxaware” statute. As discussed earlier, the FLSA only applies to
“employees,” not independent contractors or other quasi-classes of
workers.296 This distinction tracks the divisions that the IRS makes for
employers regarding which individuals are subject to payroll tax and
withholding requirements.297 Contrast this with other major employment
statutes like the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSHA), which can
apply to a much broader class of individuals.298 While this “awareness”
is not overt or obvious by any means, it is worth consideration.
The Supreme Court has also previously lent its support (albeit perhaps
unintentionally) to distinctions that track the Tax Code. In Alamo
Foundation, the Court made two notable statements: (1) that in-kind
benefits were “wages in another form,”299 and (2) that the FLSA would
apply only to the “ordinary commercial activities” of the Foundation,
rather than its charitable ones.300 Under the Tax Code, in-kind benefits
such as housing are included in an individual’s taxable income and
effectively treated as “wages in another form” for the purposes of

292. Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the Illusions of Simplification, 2 GEO.
MASON INDEP. L. REV. 319, 320 (1994); J.B. Ruhl & Daniel Martin Katz, Measuring, Monitoring,
and Managing Legal Complexity, 101 IOWA L. REV. 191, 193 (2015).
293. I.R.C. § 509(a).
294. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2.
295. I.R.C. § 511.
296. See Fair Labor Standards of Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2012); discussion infra Part I.
297. Publication 15, (Circular E), Employer’s Tax Guide, DEPT. OF THE TREAS., INTERNAL REV.
SERV. 9 (2017).
298. On its face, OSHA also applies to “employees,” and has a similarly ambiguous definition of
the term to the FLSA. Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652(6) (2012) (defining
“employee” as “an employee of an employer who is employed in a business of his employer which
affects commerce”). However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the term in such a way that it can
include a broader range of individuals. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
752 (1989).
299. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985).
300. Id. at 302–03.
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income tax, subject to some exceptions.301 And as will be discussed
further in section IV.C.1, the split between commercial and charitable
activities already exists in the Tax Code for determining when taxexempt organizations must pay unrelated business income tax, and when
organizations may qualify as tax-exempt, period.302
Lastly, while the Tax Code governs nearly every individual and
organization in the United States, it has special relevance to nonprofits.
Nonprofit organizations can be nonprofit without being tax-exempt,303
but to many the crux of nonprofit status (or, at least, charitable nonprofit
status) is the ability to receive tax-deductible donations and avoid paying
taxes.304 Because of this, the Code is arguably the most important statute
governing nonprofits and the one nonprofit managers are the most
familiar with. If there is a source that already contains bright-line
distinctions to define a narrow exception, it is the Tax Code.
C.

Three Proposals for a Tax-Based Exception

The Alamo Foundation Court may have unintentionally laid out the
bare bones of a framework for narrowing a nonprofit exception by
tracking the IRS distinction between commercial and noncommercial
activities. While many of the laws and regulations surrounding taxexempt organizations are extremely complex, the three possibilities
below offer comparatively simple ways to narrow an exception and are
based in (for the most part) well-settled law. While none of these
exceptions are perfect, nor will any one of them address every policy
concern, any of them would offer gains over a blanket exception and
would be an easy solution for both Congress and nonprofits to adopt.
1.

An Exception for Interns Who Support Exempt Purpose Activities,
but Not Commercial Ones

The first possible exception would allow nonprofits to have unpaid
interns if the interns’ work supports exempt purpose activities, but not if

301. I.R.C. § 61(a).
302. I.R.C. § 511.
303. E.g., WASH. ATT’YS ASSISTING CMTY. ORGS./KING CTY BAR ASS’N YOUNG LAWS. DIV.,
WASHINGTON NONPROFIT HANDBOOK: HOW TO FORM AND MAINTAIN A NONPROFIT
CORPORATION IN WASHINGTON STATE 8 (2009 ed.) (“Organizations can be incorporated under
Chapter 24.06 RCW, the Nonprofit Miscellaneous and Mutual Corporation Act, for any lawful
purpose, including, but not limited to, mutual, social, cooperative, fraternal, beneficial, service,
labor organization and other purposes.”).
304. Id. at 51–52.
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they support commercial activities. This exception has strong legal
support but faces several practical and logistical challenges.
The exempt purpose/commercial split is one way in which tax law
treats certain 501(c)(3) organizations differently. The split derives from
the language of section 501(c)(3), which states that such organizations
must be “organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes.”305
Despite the “exclusive” language, later code provisions allow for limited
commercial activities, which some organizations use to raise funds for
their exempt purpose.306 Organizations that engage in such activities, as
in Alamo Foundation, must pay income tax on those revenues if the
business is regularly carried on and is not substantially related to the
organization’s purpose.307 If this “unrelated business income” constitutes
a large percentage of an organization’s overall revenues, the
organization can lose its tax exemption.308
Supreme Court precedent supports an exception based on the exempt
purpose/commercial split. The Alamo Foundation Court already
determined that the “associates” in the foundation’s rehabilitation
program were employees because their work was done in the
Foundation’s commercial businesses.309 It is a short and easy
extrapolation to extend the same principle to nonprofit interns.
The Portland Terminal holding further supports this exception.310 The
Court concluded that “employee” does not encompass individuals who,
“‘solely for’ their own ‘pleasure,’ labor in the service of a cause that
they believe in.”311 Whereas an intern working in furtherance of an
305. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (emphasis added).
306. Id. § 511; JAMES J. FISHMAN, STEPHEN SCHWARZ, & LLOYD HITOSHI MAYER, TAXATION OF
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 311 (4th ed. 2015).
307. I.R.C. §§ 511(a), 512(a), 513(a); JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 604 (4th ed. 2010).
308. I.R.C. §§ 511(a), 512(a), 513(a). Unfortunately for nonprofits, there is no set number as to
what percentage will cause an organization to forfeit tax-exempt status. INTERNAL REV. SERV.,
HOW TO LOSE YOUR 501(C)(3) TAX-EXEMPT STATUS (WITHOUT REALLY TRYING),
https://www.irs.gov/PUP/charities/charitable/How%20to%20Lose%20Your%20Tax%20Exempt%2
0Status.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3SG-QRQR] (“Earning too much income generated from unrelated
activities can jeopardize an organization’s 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.” (emphasis added));
Unrelated Business Income Taxes (UBIT) in a Nutshell, AM. INST. OF CPAS, https://www.aicpa.
org/InterestAreas/NotForProfit/Resources/TaxCompliance/Pages/UBITinaNutshell.aspx
[https://perma.cc/TE6K-PCN6] (“[Nonprofits] can lose their tax-exempt status if the IRS determines
that the percentage of their income that is from business activities unrelated to their specific exempt
purposes is excessive.” (emphasis added)).
309. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302 (1985).
310. See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947).
311. Pianko, supra note 20, at 36 (quoting Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 152).
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exempt purpose easily fits “labor[ing] in the service of a cause they
believe in,”312 an intern working in a commercial purpose—one that
would be subject to unrelated business income tax—is much harder to fit
into the Portland Terminal holding.
That said, both nonprofit managers and the DOL would likely
struggle logistically to apply and enforce such an exception. Nonprofit
interns may—and probably would—work across both commercial and
exempt purpose activities.313 This puts nonprofits in the difficult position
of either limiting interns to working on certain tasks or only paying
interns for the work they do in commercial activities. Furthermore, the
line between exempt purpose activities and commercial activities is not
always clear, especially in comparison to the other exceptions proposed
below.314
2.

An Exception for Interns Who Work at Public Charities, But Not
for Those Who Work for Private Foundations

Under the second possible exception, 501(c)(3) organizations that are
public charities would be allowed to have unpaid interns, while those
that are private foundations would not. A preference for public charities
already exists in the tax code,315 and allows for easy line drawing. It also
aligns, for the most part, with the policy goal of differentiating between
organizations that can afford to pay interns and those that cannot.
The split between public charities and private foundations is an
important division among 501(c)(3) organizations. Private foundations
generally have a higher concentration of wealth and historically have
312. Id.
313. See Hannah S. Ostroff, How to Manage Interns to Drive Your Nonprofit’s Mission this
Summer, CAPTERRA: NONPROFIT TECH. BLOG (June 25, 2015), http://blog.capterra.com/how-tomanage-interns-nonprofits-mission-this-summer/ [https://perma.cc/G9SH-VSTA] (suggesting that
“an intern could make a great event planning assistant for the fundraising gala coming up in a few
months, or writing posts for your organization’s blog”).
314. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 307, at 605 (“The ‘substantially related’ test is more
difficult to apply. The regulations offer little more than abstract generalizations . . . .”). Take, for
example, Revenue Ruling 73-105, which involved gift shop sales at a tax-exempt art museum. The
gift shop sold art-related items including reproductions of artistic works and art literature, as well as
non-art-related items like scientific books and local souvenirs. The IRS deemed that income from
the sale of art-related items was related to the museum’s organizational purpose, whereas income
from the sale of non-art-related items was not. The income from non-related items thus had to be
separated out and taxed accordingly under the unrelated business income provisions. Rev. Rul. 73105, 1973-1 C.B. 264.
315. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 507(c)–(d) (imposing certain taxes on private foundations which are not
imposed on public charities); FISHMAN ET AL., supra note 306, at 450–52 (explaining the private
foundation excise tax regime in detail).
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been seen as more susceptible to abuse or use for tax evasion,316 so they
are subject to greater regulation by the IRS.317 On the other hand, public
charities have fewer regulatory requirements but are harder to form. A
new 501(c)(3) organization is presumed to be a private foundation unless
it presents evidence to the contrary.318 To be classified as a public
charity, an organization must demonstrate that it is either one of a select
subset of organizations,319 or that it receives a certain portion of its total
support from public sources.320 An exception favoring public charities
tracks the legislative preference behind these provisions of the Code.
The line between private foundations and public charities is very
clear, unlike the one between organizational purpose and commercial
activities. The IRS generally classifies organizations as one or the other
immediately upon conferring tax-exempt status.321 Although a public
charity can lose its status and be reclassified as a private foundation, this
occurs only with significant lead time.322 An exception narrowed along
this line would therefore be easy to implement.
Private foundations are also generally in a better position to pay
interns without suffering some of the consequences raised supra in
section III.C.1. These organizations tend to have a higher amount of
financial capital than public charities and are therefore unlikely to be

316. Tax Abuse of Charitable Organizations: Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance,
108th Cong. 4–5 (2004) (Statement of Jay D. Adkisson) (June 22, 2004), http://www.finance.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/062204jatest.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZPG4-BEBU];
FISHMAN
&
SCHWARZ, supra note 307, at 712.
317. Private Foundations, IRS.GOV, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitableorganizations/private-foundations [https://perma.cc/3XNQ-UWTG] (noting five extra restrictions on
private foundations).
318. Id. (“Even if an organization falls within one of the categories excluded from the definition
of private foundation, it will be presumed to be a private foundation, . . . unless it gives timely
notice to the IRS that it is not [one].”).
319. I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A) (churches, schools, hospitals, medical research
organizations, agricultural research organizations, and governmental units).
320. Id. § 509(a)(2) (providing that one-third of its annual support must come from public
sources, and no more than one-third of its annual support may come from the sum of investment
income and unrelated business income).
321. See Private Foundations, supra note 317 (“Generally, organizations use Form 1023,
Application for Recognition of Exemption, for this purpose.”).
322. Advance Ruling Process Elimination - Public Support Test, IRS.GOV, https://www.irs.gov/
charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/advance-ruling-process-elimination-public-supporttest [https://perma.cc/FL7W-VSQZ] (stating that an organization’s public charity status is
reassessed on an annual basis starting five years after its tax exemption is obtained, and that an
organization that meets the public support test in a given year is classified as a public charity for the
two years following).
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forced out of the market.323 There would still be a large number of
internships available, as low-budget public charities would not be
prevented from offering them due to cost.
An exception for public charities would not, however, account for a
policy concern raised in the Johnson Note. Many large public charities
are sophisticated corporate entities that are almost indistinguishable from
their for-profit counterparts.324 Allowing these nonprofits a privileged
status with regard to interns would further contribute to the inefficiency
outlined in section III.B.2. The size-based exception articulated below,
however, will better address this specific concern.
3.

An Exception for Interns Who Work at Small Nonprofits, as
Determined by the Organization’s Annual Tax Filing

With the final potential exception, small nonprofits would not have to
pay interns, while large nonprofits would be required to do so. But how
big is too big? Fortunately, the IRS already breaks down 501(c)(3)
organizations by size in a way an exception could easily track. This
exception would provide the same advantages of the public
charity/private foundation distinction above, but with additional benefits.
The IRS distinguishes between organizations by size for the purposes
of annual filing requirements.325 Despite their tax-exempt status, most
501(c)(3) organizations are required to file an annual return (Form 990)
in some format.326 The breakdown of what organizations file which
form, determined by gross receipts and assets, is as follows:
323. Per 2013 statistics, the average assets of a public charity were just over $3 million, while the
average assets of a private foundation were more than double that, at $6.5 million. Compare
Number of Public Charities in the United States, 2013, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHARITABLE STATS., http://
nccsweb.urban.org/PubApps/profileDrillDown.php?state=US&rpt=PC
[https://perma.cc/466BVAFW] (dividing total assets by total number of public charities to get $3,064,751.86), with
Number of Private Foundations in the United States, 2013, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHARITABLE STATS.,
http://nccsweb.urban.org/PubApps/profileDrillDown.php?state=US&rpt=PF
[https://perma.cc/TP8Q-WBCK] (dividing total assets by total number of private foundations to get
$6,421,856.65). But see King McGlaughon, Think You Know Private Foundations? Think Again.,
STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Jan. 2, 2014), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/think_you_know
_private_foundations_think_again [https://perma.cc/XMG6-SC7T] (noting that for private
foundations, the average is a misrepresentation as two-thirds have endowments of less than $1
million).
324. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1158.
325. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(a)(2)(i); see also Which Forms Do Exempt Organizations File?,
IRS.GOV,
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/form-990-series-which-forms-do-exemptorganizations-file-filing-phase-in [https://perma.cc/2VYA-3QBD] [hereinafter IRS Filing
Requirements].
326. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(a)(1). A few categories of 501(c)(3) organizations are exempt from
filing requirements, including religious organizations, subsidiaries of other nonprofits which are
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Table 1:
IRS Filing Requirements by Organization Type and Size327
Status
501(c) organization with gross
receipts normally ≤ $50,000
501(c) organization with gross
receipts < $200,000 and total assets
< $500,000
501(c) organization with gross
receipts ≥ $200,000, or total assets
≥ $500,000
Private foundation, regardless of
financial status

Form to File
990-N
990-EZ

990

990-PF

Like the public charity/private foundation line, it would be relatively
easy for the IRS to offer an exception to certain nonprofits by size. As
shown in Table 1, 501(c) organizations are required to file one of four
tax forms on an annual basis dependent on their gross receipts and
assets.328 While the exact numbers attached to each form may be
adjusted over time,329 tying an exception to the specific form an
organization must file would likely provide long-term consistency. An
exception that allows unpaid interns at 501(c)(3) organizations eligible
to file the 990-N or 990-EZ, but not at those who must file the regular
990 or 990-PF, would effectively encompass the exception proposed in
section IV.C.2 while further narrowing it for public charities above a
certain size. Therefore, a filing-based exception would address the same
policy concerns articulated above along with excluding the
“sophisticated corporate entities” Johnson mentions.330
The potential tradeoff of this exception is swinging too far in the
opposite direction—excluding too many “middle class” public charities
covered under a group return, government corporations, and state institutions that provide essential
services. Id. § 1.6033(2)(g).
327. IRS Filing Requirements, supra note 325.
328. Id.
329. See Exempt Organizations Annual Reporting Requirements – Overview (Who Must File and
Return Required), IRS.GOV, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/faqs_annualreporting_overview.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4U5V-7BLZ] (indicating that the 990 filing threshold would be raised from
$25,000 to $50,000 in 2010, and that organizations which previously had no filing requirement
would be required to file the 990-N starting in 2008).
330. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1158.
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who may be just above the threshold for filing a regular 990, but don’t
have a large enough budget to reasonably support paid interns. More
than 932,000 organizations (including all 501(c)s) were projected to file
a return other than the 990-PF in 2015, and roughly 49% of them were
projected to file the regular 990, compared to 18% for the 990-EZ and
33% for the 990-N.331
However, looking at statistics as of August 2016, roughly 440,000
reporting public charities showed the following breakdown in terms of
revenue and assets:
Table 2:
Public Charities by Revenue and Assets, August 2016332
Total Revenue
< $100,000
$100,000–249,000
$250,000–499,999
$500,000–999,999
$1–5 mil.
$5–10 mil.
$10–100 mil.
> $100 mil.

% Reporting
Charities
48
17
10
7
10
2
3
1

Total Assets
< $100,000
$100,000–249,000
$250,000–499,999
$500,000–999,999
$1–5 mil.
$5–10 mil.
$10–100 mil.
> $100 mil.

% Reporting
Charities
51
12
9
7
12
3
4
1

While this data set does not directly track the 990 filing increments, it
shows that a relatively small percentage of public charities fall into the
“middle class” area where they must file the regular 990 but have submillion dollar assets and revenues. Only a combined 17% have revenues
between $250,000 and $1 million, while only 7% have assets in the
range of $500,000 to $1 million.333 This indicates that although there is a
downside to a filing-based exception, its overall effects may be minimal
compared with the other proposals.

331. See Brett Collins, Projections of Federal Tax Return Filings: Calendar Years 2009–2016,
IRS.GOV: STATS. OF INCOME BULL., fig.A (Winter 2010), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/10winbulreturnfilings.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4SH-W8SZ].
332. Registered Nonprofit Organizations by Level of Total Assets (BMF 08/2016), NAT’L CTR.
FOR CHARITABLE STATS., http://nccsweb.urban.org/tablewiz/showreport.php [https://perma.cc/J8JLUF2D].
333. Id.
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Ultimately, Congress will have to decide who to favor and who to
burden with any decision related to FLSA exceptions. An activitiesbased exception would create logistical headaches for nonprofit
managers, while a filing-based exception would leave a “donut hole” for
middle-class organizations. An exception for public charities would add
to an already-existing regulatory burden on private foundations. But any
of the proposals described above would provide a better balance of
burdens than what currently exists under the broad exception framework.
CONCLUSION
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight is only one in a long line of cases debating
who must be paid a minimum wage under the FLSA.334 The most
significant thing that has emerged from that debate is confusion over
whether interns and similar individuals are “employees” as defined by
the statute. This lack of clarity is even more challenging for nonprofits
than for-profits, as many lack the resources to seek legal assistance on
the matter.335
A broad exception would make things easier for nonprofits but at this
time lacks a strong foundation in law.336 Without such a foundation, an
“illusory exemption” only creates more uncertainty for nonprofits while
making life harder for interns.337 A broad exception is also in conflict not
only with the goals of the FLSA but also with the case law interpreting
it.338
Instead, a narrow exception is the answer. A narrow nonprofit
exception would track legislative intent, fit within existing Supreme
Court precedent, and address many of the policy concerns inherent
within the issue.339 Tax law offers an easy route to such an exception.340
Any of the three possible exceptions outlined in this Comment would
also have the merits of being both easy to implement and already
familiar to the nonprofit sector. Congress should move to amend the
FLSA and adopt a narrow exception on one or more of these grounds.

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

See supra Parts I & II.
See supra section III.A.
See supra section III.B.
Harthill, supra note 15, at 601. See also supra notes 260–63 and accompanying text.
See supra section IV.A.
See supra section IV.A.
See supra section IV.B.

